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Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc networks play an important role in the 
success of a new class of vehicles, i.e. self-driving and semi self-
driving vehicles. These networks provide safety and comfort to 
passengers, drivers and vehicles themselves. These vehicles depend 
heavily on external communication to predicate the surrounding 
environment through the exchange of cooperative awareness 
messages (CAMs) and control data. VANETs are exposed to many 
types of attacks such as black hole, grey hole and rushing attacks. 
In this paper, we present an intelligent Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) which relies on anomaly detection to protect external 
communications from grey hole and rushing attacks. Many 
researchers agree that grey hole attacks in VANETs are a 
substantial challenge due to them having their distinct types of 
behaviour: normal and abnormal. These attacks try to prevent 
transmission between vehicles and roadside units and have a direct 
and negative impact on the wide acceptance of this new class of 
vehicles. The proposed IDS is based on features that have been 
extracted from a trace file generated in a network simulator. In our 
paper, we used a feed-forward neural network and a support 
vector machine for the design of the intelligent IDS. The proposed 
system uses only significant features extracted from the trace file. 
Our research, concludes that a reduction in the number of features 
leads to a higher detection rate and a decrease in false alarms. 
Keywords—security; vehicular ad hoc networks; intrusion detection 
system; self-driving car; semi self-driving car.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) play a significant role in 
the development and the deployment of self-driving and semi 
self-driving vehicles which makes them a field of great interest. 
All layers of the VANETs are exposed to many types of attacks. 
Security is one of the biggest challenges in vehicular ad hoc 
networks [1]. In this paper, we focus on attacks on the network 
layer, for instance denial of service (DoS), black hole, grey hole, 
wormhole and rushing attacks [2]. In our research, we have 
designed an intrusion detection system (IDS) to secure the 
network layer in VANETs from potential attacks. Because the 
network layer deals directly with routing protocols, the design of 
a security system for the routing protocols is needed. 
Three types of routing approaches are used in ad hoc 
networks: proactive approach, reactive approach and hybrid 
approach [3]. A routing protocol such as on demand vector 
(AODV) is considered one of the reactive routing protocols that 
has been commonly used in external communication for 
autonomous vehicles. The motivation to select the AODV 
protocol is a high rate of throughput, low rate of delay, and 
sequence numbering [3]. The sequence numbers make AODV 
more efficient in terms of performance, when compared with 
other routing protocols. Self-driving and semi self-driving 
vehicles rely heavily on external communication for transferring 
and receiving notification messages and control messages. 
Attacks like grey hole and rushing attacks can contribute to 
thwart cooperation for the purpose of creating a disconnect 
between the vehicles and the road side units (RSUs) [2]. The 
basic principle of VANETs is to allow mobile nodes and 
infrastructures on the roadside to exchange packets from the 
source node to the destination node, but malicious nodes create 
disorder or drop packets rather than forward these to the 
appropriate destination node. Grey hole attacks are considered a 
possible attack which targets the network layer in a 
communication system for autonomous vehicles. In the case of 
an attack, all or some received packets are dropped and not 
forwarded to the destination node. Additionally, in an attack 
other problems can be created such as an increase in overhead 
and a decrease of the packet delivery rate (PDR) on the network 
[2]. Many researchers consider the detection of the grey hole 
attacks in AODV a difficult task because it has two types of 
behaviours (normal  and malicious) [4]. In other words, the 
network can forward all packets to the destination node during 
the discovery process just like in honest behaviours, but the 
network can then maliciously be made to gradually drop some or 
all received packets [4].  
Rushing attacks or sudden attacks are considered a new type 
of  DoS attacks that have a direct and negative impact on the 
performance of routing protocol, especially on demand ad hoc 
network routing protocols such as AODV and dynamic source 
route (DSR) [2]. In the road discovery phase, the source vehicle 
floods road requests (RREQ) to destination vehicle through 
VANETs. In this case, the rushing vehicle will receive RREQ 
and directly forward the packet to destination vehicles without 
any delay (zero delay) for this reason named rushing [5]. The 
destination will discard the original packet as a duplicate packet 
because the node already received the packet from rushing 
attacks. This type of attack is more effective when it is close to 
the source or destination vehicles [5].  
 In self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles, external and 
internal communication systems are considered one of the 
essential components. Grey hole attacks can create many 
problems for vehicles in these networks like preventing vehicles 
from receiving important messages from other nodes in that 
zone. Figure 1 shows how VANET’s operate. 
 
 
Here we propose an IDS to protect external communication 
in autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles from grey hole 
and rushing attacks. The proposed security system has the ability 
to detect abnormal/malicious behavior in real time thus 
preventing a malicious vehicle from communicating with other 
vehicles. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 An example of the process of responding to cases of emergency on the 
road 
The IDS utilises trace files generated from the simulator; it 
contains features that describe normal and abnormal behavior in 
VANETs. The type and the number of features have an 
important role in increasing the detection rate and decreasing 
false alarms in the proposed security system. We selected a 
significant feature extracted from the trace file based on our 
previous study [6]. Support vector machine (SVM) and feed 
forward neural networks (FFNN) are used in the design of our 
proposed IDS. The main reason for using these artificial 
intelligent networks is that significant number of research attests 
to the efficiency of these networks, particularly in self-driving 
vehicles [7]. 
This paper is organized in the following way: Section II 
explores related work in the research area of attacks on 
VANETs. Section III describes the methodology and section IV 
explains the experimental results. Section V shows the 
discussion. Section VI provides conclusions and future 
directions of research. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Traffic accidents have caused the deaths of thousands of 
people over the world [8]. Researchers in the field of VANETs 
for intelligent transport system (ITS) are developing networks 
to increase the safety of passengers and vehicles. Their target is 
to provide safety to the users on the road through enhanced 
traffic systems that lead to a decrease in the number of accidents 
that occur from human errors. In real-time applications, self-
driving vehicles need access to important information such as 
warning messages and cooperative awareness messages 
(CAMs) between vehicles and RSUs. Therefore, security and 
safety becomes a very important issue in VANETs 
developments.  
Some research seeks to improve the performance of 
VANETs by enhancing their defense systems against malicious 
attacks. Assila et al. present a new security scheme to protect 
VANETs from the potential attacks. They present a new design 
based on the verification of cooperative awareness messages. 
This scheme helps researchers to reduce the number of attacks 
and address the threats. Banerjee proposed a security system to 
detect and remove both grey hole and black hole attacks on the 
MANETs [9]. The main idea is that the data is divided into equal 
blocks, then the blocks are sent to the destination node by a 
different route rather than sending all the data in the same route. 
The destination node checks the size of the sent data; when the 
system is found to differ in the size of the received data, it can 
detect the malicious route. In this case, the source node was 
asked to send the data again and avoid the malicious route and 
the malicious nodes therein [9]. Reddy et al. proposed a cross 
layer intrusion detection (CLID) to secure Wireless Mesh 
Networks (WMNs) against rushing attacks [5]. The CLID was 
built at the network layer and the MAC layer to reduce the false 
alarm rate. The cooperative intrusion system evaluated the 
proposed security system with network simulator.  Al Shahrani, 
proposed two approaches to handling overhead and time in 
security dynamic source router (SDSR) based on all neighbours 
nodes are safe [10]. Pavani et al. designed an intrusion detection 
system to secure MANETs against both black hole and grey hole 
attacks [11]. Their research used four types of machine learning 
approaches: Decision Tree (C–4.5), Multi-Layer Perceptron 
(MLP), K-Nearest Neighborhood (KNN) and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM). The proposed method was applied by using the 
network simulator version 2 (NS2). It can be observed from the 
experimental results that MLP detected the intrusions with more 
precision and with less false error rates than the other 
approaches. Kaur et al. Devised an intrusion detection system 
based on the Backpropagation neural network [12]. The main 
aim of this security system was to secure MANETs against black 
hole attacks. The researchers were able to prove the efficiency of 
the ANN in their research and they used different types of 
performance metrics to calculate the effectiveness of the IDS in 
MANETs.  
Generally, IDSs have two types of detection methods. These 
methods are misuse and anomaly detection [13]. In our paper, 
we propose a security system that uses anomaly detection. 
Misuse or signature detection systems rely on the features of 
known attacks, are highly accurate and have a low rate of false 
alarms, but they cannot consistently identify novel attacks. 
Anomaly or behavior detection is based on the normal behavior 
of nodes. It classifies any action that considerably deviates from 
the normal behavior an attack. However, anomaly detection 
systems have a high rate of false alarms, difficulty in handling 
gradual misbehavior and are computationally expensive.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
In our paper, we propose a security system based on the 
behaviour of vehicles, whether normal or abnormal that is 
collected from the trace file. The proposed IDS can provide 
sufficient protection against grey hole attacks and rushing of the 
external communication in self-driving vehicles. The steps 
below explain the methodology of the proposed security system: 
A. Simulation of Traffic and Mobility Scenarios 
We selected an efficient network simulator NS2 to evaluate 
and measure the performance of the proposed security system 
[14]. NS2 uses two software solutions to create a real scenario of 
normal and/ or abnormal behavior in VANETs. These are: 
Simulation of Urban Mobility Model (SUMO) and MObilty 
VEhicles (MOVE) [14]. The SUMO is computationally efficient 
 
 
and it is widely used in different sizes of scenarios in VANETs 
[15] [16] and the MOVE model is built on SUMO.      The urban 
and highway mobility model is commonly used in NS2. We 
employed the urban mobility model of Manhattan because it 
flexible and is widely used in this research field [17].  
B. Feature Sets and Extraction  
The proposed IDS relies on a trace file that was generated 
from NS2. The IDS infers from features whether the behaviour 
of vehicles is normal or abnormal. Generally, researchers 
consider extracting features from a trace file difficult because it 
consists of large and overlapping data. We used the AWK 
language to extract features that capture the events of vehicles in 
VANETs. They describe five events: send (s), receive (r), drop 
(D), forward (f) and movement (M) [18].  
The rate of the detection system and number of false alarms 
based on the number and the type of features that were extracted 
from the trace file. The steps below explain how the features 
were extracted:  
1. Generate the trace file from NS2.  
2. Use AWK language to analyse the output file from NS2. 
3. Produce 21 features that describe normal and abnormal 
behaviour. 
4. Select fifteen features based on our previous study that 
accurately reflect the behaviour of self-driving vehicles 
[6]. 
Table 1 shows the 15 selected features from whole features 
that were used in the proposed security system. 
Table 1 Features Selection 
Basic Trace IP Trace AODV Trace 
Packet ID, Payload 
Size and Type, 
Source and 
Destination MAC, 
and Ethernet 
IP Source 
and 
Destination 
Packet Tagged, Hop 
Counts, Broadcast ID, 
Destination IP with 
Sequence number, 
Source IP with Sequence 
number 
C. Fuzzification of the Dataset 
The extracted features can have some problems that have a 
direct impact on the average detection rate and number of false 
alarms of the system, such as the distribution of the features or 
if the name of the classes is not well defined or ambiguous 
between the normal and malicious behavior. In this situation, we 
need a mathematical model to redistribute the features and 
develop solutions to ambiguity such as a fuzzy set. We use the 
fuzzy set well-known and widely used in scientific fields for a 
number of reasons, including efficiency [19]. Fuzzy sets are 
considered a good solution of the classification problem by 
applying a fuzzification on the features that were extracted from 
the trace file “NS2”. When comparing these results with our 
previous research where fuzzy sets were not used, we obtained a 
false alarm rate ranging from 0.17% to 12.24% [6]. We can 
clearly notice the important role of fuzzification in enhancing the 
detection rate and reduction of  false alarms.  
According to equation 1, each value is distributed in four 
values of fuzzy with a range in [0, 1]. 
 
     (1) 
Where x is the feature value while a, b and c represent the 
values of the fuzzy domain. Employing fuzzification data 
increase the detection rate of IDS as well as decreasing the 
number of false alarms that are generated from IDS.  
             
D. Simulation Parameters and Mobility Scenarios 
Self-driving communication are created on the NS2 as shown 
in figure 2, this shows four malicious vehicles, two perpetrating 
grey hole and two rushing attacks. NS2 has many characteristics 
that have encouraged many researchers to use it, such as speed 
of simulation, low cost and a rich library. Moreover, it is open 
source and object-oriented [20].  
Fig. 2 Screenshot of NS2 
In figure 2, we notice the type of mobility model, number of 
malicious attacks and infrastructure communication based on 
road side every 250m RSUs (Access_Point1, 2, 3, n).  
An important issue in simulation systems are the initial 
parameters because they have a vital role in determining 
behaviour, mobility and traffic type of vehicles. These include 
parameters such as Type of Traffic (CBR), Radio Propagation 
Model (Two Ray Ground) and Routing protocol (greyholeaodv) 
[17].  
E. Intelligent Intrusion Detection System 
Here, we designed an intelligent IDS based on an FFNN and 
SVM to detect vehicles doing a grey hole and rushing attacks in 
VANETs. Many recent studies have focused on ANN as the 
most efficient tool in building internal and external systems for 
self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles [7]. The proposed 
IDS used a data set of 30,000 records to describe the normal and 
abnormal behaviour in VANETs. The data set collected from 
the trace file was divided into three subsets: the test set, the 
validation set and the training set. We tried to avoid one of the 
most common problems of an ANN which is the over fitting 
employing parts of the data used to validate the network 
performance. 
 To select the best configuration of the ANN, we used the 
principle of trial and error to configure and select the best ratio 
of training depending on the condition select that have been 
established in the proposed system. The initial parameters play 
an important role in the performance of the FFNN that have a 
direct impact on the performance of detection. Figure 3 shows 
the best structure of the FFNN that was selected in our proposal. 
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Fig. 3 Structure of the ANN 
We explain some the parameters that were used in our 
research such as learning parameter and TrainParam. goal. In 
this case, we describe the formal mathematical formula for this 
parameter for FFNN and SVM. Equation 2 is the learning 
function for the SVM, data training:  
 
 
 
Where the range value of  , 1, 2, 3 , 4, …, n. The 
value of  indicates the class. In FFNN, the training phase ends 
when the least-square-error E value between the desired  and 
actual output   is less than  .  
 
Where p is the total number of training patterns, and 
 
The initial parameters play an important role in the 
performance of the FFNN that have a direct impact on the 
performance of detection. Table 2 shows the parameters of the 
training phase used in the FFNN. 
Table 2 ANN Parameters 
Parameter Value 
TrainParam. epochs 46 
TrainParam. lr 1*10-8 
TrainParam. goal 0 
TrainParam. min_grad 1*10-13 
Gaussian Radial Basis Function 1 
BoxConstraint 1e5 
 
The simulation is based on the system with an Intel 5744 
core i3-380M processor “2.53GHZ” and 4GB RAM memory. 
 
F. Generate Grey hole and Rushing attacks 
  To evaluate performance of security system, we need to 
create two types of scenarios previously identified: normal and 
abnormal behavior. Many researchers consider that creating 
grey hole attacks is difficult [4] in VANETs because these 
attacks have two types of behavior normal and abnormal. In 
other words, the vehicle may be normal at time t=0 and become 
malicious at time t=n. This makes creating grey hole attacks a 
big challenge in ad hoc networks. The malicious behaviour that 
leads to dropping some or all received packets, it is created in 
NS2 using the Object Tool Command Language (OTCL) script 
and Object-oriented programming. However, we need to create 
a new routing protocol (grey hole aodv) to generate grey hole 
attacks in VANETs. In addition, we need to modify some files in 
the AODV routing protocol to create rushing attacks. The 
simulation environment consists of 40 vehicles and 9 RSUs 
[17]. It has two grey hole vehicles and two rushing vehicles in 
our scenario. The principle of detection is based on vehicle that 
drop packets that it received from vehicles or RSU in that zone.  
G. The Intrusion Detection System    
In our research, the ANN consists of an input layer, a hidden 
layer and an output layer. The input layer comprised 75 neurons 
equal to the fuzzified features that were extracted from the trace 
file after applying a fuzzy set to them. We designed two hidden 
layers to increase the accuracy of detection of the system and to 
decrease the number of false alarms. The first hidden layer 
consisted of 5 neurons, the second hidden layer consisted of 11 
neurons and the output layer consisted of 2 neurons (“normal” 
and “abnormal”).   
The proposed IDS has eight stages, and the overall architecture 
of the proposed security system is shown in Figure 4, namely: 
 The first stage (generate the realistic world) - in this stage, 
we used two software programs to generate the mobility 
and traffic model that reflected the real movement of 
vehicles in VANETs. NS2 used the output files from 
SUMO and MOVE as input to generate a trace file that 
describes normal and abnormal. 
 The second stages (NS2) - we used the output files from the 
previous stage as input files for the NS2. We simulated 
normal, grey hole and rushing attacks to generate two files. 
These files are the trace file and the NAM file. 
 The third stage (data extraction) - In this stage, we extracted 
all the features from the trace file that were generated in the 
previous stage. However, the proposed system only used 15 
significant features from all the features [6]. Reducing the 
number of features has a vital role in increasing the 
detection rate and decreasing the false alarms.  
 The fourth stage (pre-processing): in this stage, the selected 
features were pre-processed to convert some letters and 
symbols to numbers, and to generate a uniform distribution 
to balance the different types of classes in collecting the 
data to increase the efficiency of the detection rate and 
normalisation process to convert all the values of the 
features between zero and one. 
 The fifth stage (fuzzy set): we needed to convert the normal 
data that was generated in the previous stage into fuzzified 
data. This process can solve some common problems that 
occur in the data set such as overlap and a lack of clarity.  
 The sixth stage (training and testing phase – FFNN): we 
trained and tested the FFNN with the extracted data that 
was produced in the previous stage. In this stage, we 
obtained the detection rate for normal and abnormal 
behaviour, and we calculated four types of alarm.  
 The seventh stage (training and testing phase – SVM): we 
trained and tested the SVM with fuzzified data that was 
extracted in the fifth stage to check the efficiency of the 
 
 
proposed security system in the detection of grey hole and 
rushing vehicles in comparison to normal vehicles. 
 The eighth stage (comparison): in this stage, we compared 
the two proposed intrusion detection systems based on the 
four criteria, detection rate, the number of false alarms, 
error rate and standard deviation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
      
 
   Fig. 4 IDS Architecture  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We generated two types of scenarios and simulated these 
under actual conditions in order to obtain real data. This data was 
processed to extract the significant features with some pre-
processing of the data. In this case, we have ready data for 
training and testing to measure the performance of the proposed 
intelligent detection system. The total accuracy of the training 
algorithm is 99.71% in training phase. We calculated four types 
of alarms: true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative 
(TN) and false negative (FN) According to the equation 4, we 
can calculate the accuracy of the detection system [13]:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Testing Neural Network to detect Grey hole Attacks 
We tested the IDS with the fuzzified data that was  generated 
from the trace file to detect grey hole attacks in external 
communication for self-driving vehicles. In this phase, we 
measured the detection rate and to calculate of the alarms. We 
employed cross validation for FFNN and SVM to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed security system.  In this case, the 
datasets are divided into 20 datasets (k=20) that have been used 
90% from datasets in the training phase and 5% in testing phase. 
We repeated this process to measure the performance for IDS by 
calculating the detection rate for normal and abnormal, alarms 
and standard deviation (SD). Table 3 shows the detection 
accuracy rate and the number of records that were used in our 
proposed security system. 
Table 3 Classification Rate 
     IDS   
Class Accuracy Time/s Error Rate SD 
SVM-Normal 99.93% 
0.12s 0.21 0.429 
SVM-Abnormal 99.64% 
Class Accuracy Time/s Error Rate SD 
FFNN-Normal 99.82% 
0.99s 0.15 0.102 
FFNN-Abnormal 99.86% 
Table 4 shows the rate of four alarms for grey hole and rushing 
attacks. 
Table 4: Alarm Rate 
Alarm Type FFNN SVM 
True positive 99.92% 99.88% 
True negative 99.75% 99.89% 
False negative 0.08% 0.11% 
False positive 0.25% 0.12% 
B. Testing Neural Network to detect Rushing Attack 
The type and number of records that was used in the training 
phase differs from the data set that was used in the testing phase. 
The IDS should be able to detect rushing attacks that have a 
direct and negative impact on VANETs. In both proposed 
security systems, we designed IDS with anomaly detection. It has 
the ability to detect novel attacks. Table 5 shows the accuracy of 
the detection rate and the number of records that were used in 
our proposed security system. 
                           Table 5: Classification Rate 
Table 6 shows the rate of four alarms for grey hole and rushing 
attacks. 
Table 6 Alarm Rate 
Alarm Type FFNN SVM 
True positive 99.86% 99.70% 
True negative 99.78% 99.92% 
False negative 0.12% 0.30% 
False positive 0.22% 0.07% 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
The motivation of this research is to provide an intelligent 
security system that creates a safe environment for self-driving 
and semi self-driving vehicles. The methodology of the proposed 
IDS was implemented in eight phases: generating the mobility 
and traffic model, the NS-2, the trace file, data collection and 
pre-processing, fuzzification of the data, training and testing for 
the FFNN, training and testing for the SVM and comparing the 
results that were generated in the two types of intelligent IDS. 
When we compare the two types of IDS, we can observe that the 
IDS was based on the FFNN was more effective and efficient in 
detecting malicious vehicles with a low false negative alarm rate 
than the IDS based on the SVM but we can notice SVM 
performance much faster the FFNN. The comparison 
        IDS   
Class Accuracy Time/s 
Error 
Rate SD 
SVM-Normal 99.79% 0.23 0.18% 0.139 SVM-Abnormal 99.80% 
Class Accuracy Time/s 
Error 
Rate SD 
FFNN-Normal 99.80% 1.01 0.19% 0.127 FFNN-Abnormal 99.75% 
Traffic and Mobility  Network Simulator 
Trace File Pre-processing Fuzzification 
Training & Testing FFNN Training & Testing SVM 
Comparison of Results 
 
 
performance between the FFNN and SVM is as shown in figure 
5. The error rate for the IDS based on the SVM was 0.19%. In 
this system, the alarm rate fluctuated between 99.92% and 
99.70% with excellent and efficient accuracy. On the other hand, 
the average false negative alarm rate was low at about 0.20% 
which is a good indicator of the results.  
                           Fig. 5: Performance Comparsion 
Meanwhile, the error rate for the IDS based on the FFNN was 
0.17%. The alarm rate fluctuated between 99.92% and 99.75% 
with good and efficient accuracy. On the other hand, the average 
false negative alarm rate was low at about 0.1% which is an 
excellent indicator of the results. We could improve the detection 
rate by using fuzzified data with FFNN and SVM that create 
flexibility in selecting the system that is more efficiently with 
different conditions. In addition, in our proposal, we selected the 
significant features based on the previous study [6]. All these 
factors make the proposed security system more efficient in 
securing the external communication systems of self-driving and 
semi self-driving vehicles.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Intelligent intrusion detection systems have become an 
important security application in modern systems such as self-
driving and semi self-driving vehicles. The networks, vehicles 
and devices are exposed to many types of attacks that have a 
direct impact on the development and deployment of self-driving 
vehicles. Our proposed intelligent IDS can detect grey hole and 
rushing attacks in VANETs. These networks can provide safety 
to self-driving and semi self-driving by CAMs and data control 
that were exchanged between the vehicles in that zone. Grey hole 
and rushing attacks try to drop some or all received messages 
which can have a direct impact on the passenger’s life, drivers 
and vehicles themselves. In other words, self-driving and semi 
self-driving vehicles without security cannot achieve their task 
in providing comfort and safety while in operation. In our paper, 
we designed an intelligent security system to secure external 
communication for self-driving vehicles. The IDS has been 
designed for training and testing with fuzzified data by using 
FFNN and SVM. This system deals with two system scenarios 
that have been generated and simulated in NS2. The behavior of 
all vehicles is investigated to identify the normal behavior and 
abnormal behavior in VANETs. We can detect grey hole and 
rushing attacks by monitoring or analyzing the trace file 
generated in network simulator. The trace file describes the 
behaviour of the network through send, receive, move, forward 
and drop.  A possible further extension of the system is to these 
attacks with different AI techniques  such as fuzzy petri nets 
(FPNs). 
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